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Section 1 – The Origins of The Government-Sponsored Enterprises The Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) have a long history in the housing finance system of the United States. For decades, they played a crucial role in establishing a solid foundation of the secondary mortgage market, which provide liquidity, stability and affordability to the mortgage market. Taking a step back to look at the history of the GSEs is important to understanding the financial crisis, its causes, and lessons for the future (Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General).  The GSEs are the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBank System), which currently consists of 12 Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks). All of them are under the regulation and conservation of Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) since 2008. The paper will focus on the discussion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.   Before the 1930s, the mortgage market generally consisted of short-term renewable loans. These loans typically required high down payments, short maturities (3 to 6 years), and large balloon payment,1 leading to a surprisingly high monthly payment that has no beneficial to promoting homeownership. Only people with high income could afford such mortgages to purchase a house.  The Great Depression in later years exacerbated the possibility and availability of the extensive middle class to own a house. In response to this issue in 1932, the federal                                                         1 Balloon Payment: A payment the borrower must make to the lender at the mortgage term’s end. This final payment is comparatively much larger than the payments that preceded it. 
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government enacted the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (the Bank Act). The Bank Act created the FHLBank System serves a reserve credit system to provide local lenders with readily available, low-cost funding to finance housing, jobs, and economic growth (Federal Housing Finance Agency Offices of Inspector General).  In 1933, the Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLC) was signed into law. It introduced one of the most important mortgage products that remain today – long-term, fixed-rate mortgages.  To further support housing finance, the National Housing Act was enacted in 1934. It established Federal Housing Administrations (FHA) to offer federally backed insurance for home mortgages made by FHA approved lenders.2 FHA insurance protected approved lenders against losses on the mortgage they originated so that the lenders could provide lower interest rate mortgages to borrowers.   In 1938, Fannie Mae was established as a federal government agency to purchase, hold, and sell FHA-insured loans. By purchasing FHA-insured loans from private lenders, Fannie Mae provided cash to the private lenders so that private lenders were able to provide more mortgages to borrowers, creating liquidity in the mortgage market.  However, the too much financial burden Fannie Mae exerted on the Department of Housing and Urban Development pushed forward the reorganization. The Federal National Mortgage                                                         2 FHA Approved Lenders: Financial institutions that have been approved by FHA for the origination and servicing of FHA-insured mortgages.  
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Association Charter Act of 1954 (Charter Act) transformed Fannie Mae from a government agency into a public-private, mixed ownership enterprise. Fannie Mae was exempted from all state and local taxes, except real property taxes.  In order to make Fannie Mae fully financial independence, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (the 1968 HUD Act) reorganized Fannie Mae from a mixed ownership corporation to a for-profit, shareholder-owned enterprise, which finally removed Fannie Mae from the federal budget. At this point, Fannie Mae began operating as a GSE, generating profits for shareholders while enjoying the benefits of exemption from taxation and oversight as well as implied government backing (Alford, 2003). The 1968 HUD Act also created the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). Ginnie Mae is a wholly owned government corporation with the HUD remains today. Rather than buying, holding, and selling mortgages on the market, Ginnie Mae only guarantees timely payment of principal and interest payments on residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS).3  Two years later in 1970, Freddie Mac was created to expand the secondary mortgage market and end the monopoly of Fannie Mae during the past thirty years. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were authorized to buy and sell mortgages not insured or guaranteed by the federal government. In 1971, Freddie Mac issued the first conventional loan MBS.  
                                                        3 A mortgage-backed security (MBS) is a type of asset-backed security that is secured by a mortgage, or more commonly a collection ("pool") of sometimes hundreds of mortgages. The mortgages are sold to a group of individuals (a government agency or investment bank) that "securitizes", or packages, the loans together into a security that can be sold to investors. 
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In the late 1970s, the emergence of the private-label MBSs-securities issued and insured by private companies without government guarantee was the potential threat to the subprime crisis. At that time, lacking implicit government guarantee, these private-label MBSs could not compete with the conforming mortgages issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Instead, they had to concentrate on nonconforming mortgages – loans that were not conforming to the underwriting criteria of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  During the 1970s and 1980s, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac functioned as the leading lenders in the secondary mortgage market. They both purchased and sold mortgages on the market. The primary difference between their business strategies lies in Freddie Mac did not hold the purchased mortgages in its portfolio, but selling them to investors. In doing so, Freddie Mac transferred the interest rate risks from its purchased mortgages to investors. In the contrary, Fannie Mae was exposed to interest rate risk by issuing short-term debt – when interest rate rose, its borrowing cost increased while its income from existing mortgages remained fixed. The inflation and recessions of the late 1970s and early 1980s made Fannie Mae suffer from unprofitable for many years. The viability of Fannie Mae was seriously doubted. Freddie Mac, in contrast, remained profitable by the effective and successful transformation of the interest rate risk to the investors.   After that period, the two GSEs’ business strategies began to converge. Fannie Mae started securitizing mortgages in 1981 and Freddie Mac began holding mortgages in its portfolio. By 2001, the operations of the two GSEs looked virtually the same (Congressional Budget Office Financial Analysis Division, 2010). 
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From 2000 to 2007, GSEs gradually purchased larger and larger volumes of subprime mortgages and Alt-A mortgages, 45 accumulating a ticking bomb for the subprime mortgage crisis. In 2007 and 2008, housing prices decreased significantly, most of the subprime mortgage and Alt-A mortgage borrowers suffered from great losses because of the increasing interest rates and decreasing housing value. Loan delinquencies and defaults increased significantly in a short period. Thousands of people were kicked out of their homes.  The two GSEs lost billions of dollars on their investment of the high risky mortgages. The federal government established FHFA in June 2008, taking the two giants into conservation and hoping to turn over the situation. 
                                                        4 Subprime Mortgages: A classification of mortgages with high risk of default. Borrowers are typically individuals with poor credit histories who are not able to qualify for conventional mortgages. Subprime mortgages are often adjustable rate mortgages with high interest rate. 5 Alt-A mortgages: A classification of mortgages that is riskier than prime mortgages and less risky than subprime mortgages. These mortgages are often lack of documents of borrowers’ income and ability to pay back the debt. 
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Section 2 – The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and The Precrisis Model of The GSEs During the past decades, the U.S. housing finance system was so unique that it has been the envy of the world. The GSEs have been fulfilling their mission in promoting homeownership by providing liquidity, stability and affordability to the mortgage market. The homeownership rate has increased from approximate 60% in 1960s to 67% in 2009, even though there were two large recessions among the period (see Chart 1). At the same time, housing prices increased rapidly (see Chart 2). From 2001 until it reached its peak in 2006, prices of single-family homes increased by an average of more than 12% annually. Home price appreciation was accompanied by a rapid increase in mortgage indebtedness (Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General, 2012; Federal Housing Finance Agency Offices of Inspector General; Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General).  
Chart 1 - U.S. Homeownership Rate Since 1960 
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Chart 2 - National Average and Median House Prices 
By Quarter: 2000Q1-2010Q2 
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 Subprime mortgages were loaned extensively to people with poor credit history and people may not have had the ability to pay back the loans and people cannot undertake the increasing interest rate risk. From 2001 to 2006, the subprime mortgage share of the entire mortgage market tripled from 7.4% to 23.5% (see Chart 3). In 2006, there were $600 billion of subprime mortgages issued. The ever-increasing subprime mortgage provided great accessibility for mortgage borrowers to purchase homes, regardless of their income documents, credit history and motivations. The escalation of housing prices and mortgage indebtedness jeopardized the housing market. Finally, when the housing price began to plummet in the third quarter of 2006, the housing market collapsed. During the following two years, home prices decreased at least 25%. Consequently, delinquency rate and foreclosure rate rapidly increased (see Chart 4  
Chart 3 –Subprime Mortgage Share of  
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and Chart 5). Subprime mortgages had a much higher delinquency rate and foreclosure rate compared to prime mortgages. And the difference continuously enlarged since 2005. During the housing bubble, the delinquency rate and foreclosure rate of subprime mortgage borrowers were extremely high, reaching a 25.9% delinquency rate and a 15.1% foreclosure rate. Subprime mortgages kicked thousands of people out of their homes, leaving the housing market and macroeconomic heavily wounded. Some borrowers were unable to pay back their loans because they were unable to afford the increasing interest rate. Some borrowers strategically chose to foreclose because of the depreciation of the housing value. Banks and private lenders lost their business as the delinquency went up and economy went down. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as the top two largest financial institutions concentrating in mortgage finance, were also unable to cover their losses when the subprime mortgage crisis burst. In contrast, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had continuously increased their purchasing of the nonprime mortgages before the housing bubble and subprime mortgage crisis (see Table 1). In the private-label market, the combined subprime mortgage share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reached 82.6% in 2007. The unbelievable number undoubtedly shakes and even overturns the precrisis business model behind the two GSEs.6 What has made the two GSEs deviate so far from their                                                         6 Precrisis business model: The model under which the two government-sponsored enterprises operated before federal conservatorship. 
Chart 5 - Foreclosure Rate 
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traditional mortgage securities and guarantees?  
Table 1 – Subprime Mortgage and Alt-A Mortgage Share in Private-label Market 
 Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Total 
Year Subprime Alt-A Subprime Alt-A Subprime Alt-A 
2000 5.09% 6.90% 13.87% 9.01% 18.97% 15.91% 
2001 7.54% 1.35% 23.09% 10.06% 30.62% 11.41% 
2002 4.51% 3.03% 33.18% 15.38% 37.69% 18.41% 
2003 12.24% 8.14% 20.93% 10.41% 33.17% 18.55% 
2004 19.17% 9.04% 22.06% 7.46% 41.23% 16.50% 
2005 5.37% 3.82% 25.16% 6.41% 30.52% 10.23% 
2006 9.43% 2.78% 19.80% 7.09% 29.23% 9.86% 
2007 22.12% 3.21% 60.48% 6.07% 82.60% 9.28% 
Source: GAO Analysis of Loan Performance data, FHFA, Enterprise Credit Supplements  The GSEs’ mission has changed over time. Never in history have Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac put the taxpayers’ money into such huge risks when the two GSEs began purchasing more and more nonprime mortgages. The precrisis business model of the two GSEs suffers from great weaknesses (see Figure 1).   First of all, an implicit federal guarantee of the two GSEs impedes the healthy development of a fully competitive market. When Freddie Mac was first created in 1970, on one hand, it was created to further support the secondary mortgage market; on the other hand, policy makers hoped it could end the monopoly of Fannie Mae during the past three decades. However, the federal government made great mistake of guaranteeing Freddie Mac’s business just as it did to Fannie Mae. This movement did not end the monopoly of Fannie Mae; in contrast, it reinforced the two GSEs even stronger giants, especially when they  
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began to converge their business after 1980s. The federal government’s implicit guarantee of the two GSEs forced many private lenders and small companies to get out of the mortgage market. The GSEs were able to acquire a substantial degree of market power, which in turn increased risk to the overall financial system; the entities had an incentive to take excessive risks; and the costs and risks to taxpayers and the economy were not apparent in the federal budget (Congressional Budget Office Financial Analysis Division, 2010).  In the next place, the public-private model makes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac a paradox. The 1968 HUD Act removed Fannie Mae’s financial status from federal budget, making it a for profit, shareholder-owned enterprise. For many years, the GSEs were very profitable since the implicit government guarantee enabled the GSEs to guarantee their MBS and to finance their investment portfolios at lower cost than competitors. GSE profitability was increased by their charter provisions such as those exempting them from state and local income taxes, 
Figure 1 – Precrisis Business Model of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
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and by lower capital requirements than their non-GSE competitors (Weiss, Sep. 2013). In return, they were obligated to fulfill their public mission for the benefits they received, which included supporting affordable housing and underserved areas. When the private lenders found it was more profitable and competitive in issuing nonprime mortgages, the nonprime mortgage share of the private lenders increased significantly. The GSEs, in accordance with its public mission set annually by the HUD, were forced to purchase these nonprime mortgages. The purchase of nonprime mortgages counted toward meeting these goals because the underlying mortgages tended to be made to less-than-median-income borrowers or were collateralized by properties in “underserved areas” (Thomas & Van Order, 2011). However, it is the nonprime mortgages that later became the time bomb of the subprime crisis.   Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s regulation was structurally weak and ineffective. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), did not have adequate tools and authority to set capital standard to constrain risk behavior. Moreover, the OFHEO did not have the capital to resolve the GSEs once it failed, which is the mechanism that bank regulators use to resolve failed institutions. Again, the implicit government guarantee made Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac immune from close supervision.  At last, weak risk management of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made the two GSEs unable to cover the losses as the housing bubble hit. The business model that Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac were operating is based on the hypothesis that the housing price would keep increasing. 
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When the market were good, the shareholders could gain profits on their investment, while when the market were bad, the losses were transferred to the taxpayers. Their lack of consideration on systemic risk of the housing market undoubtedly left the enterprises and taxpayers in grave danger. 7 Additionally, the two GSEs were allowed to hold less adequate capital against financial risks, leaving the institutions unprepared to absorb losses.  The collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were destined because of their privileges beyond other financial institutions and market principals. However, whatever the precrisis business model is right or wrong, no one can deny the unshakable status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in constructing the American Dream. Before the decision of winding down the two GSEs has been made, taking a look at the GSEs’ products that helped generations will show us a larger picture. 
                                                        7 Systemic risk: Systemic risk is the risk of collapse of an entire financial system or entire market, as opposed to risk associated with any one individual entity, group or component of a system 
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Section 3 – The Products and Roles of The GSEs Whenever and wherever in the mortgage market, the accessibility to long-term mortgages is critical to promoting homeownership and market stability, and the role of the GSEs is crucial to the mortgages.  The long-term, fixed rate, fully amortizing, freely prepayable mortgages are the unique products of the U.S. housing finance system, fully supported by the GSEs. The long-term, fixed rate, fully amortizing, freely prepayable mortgages are more accessible and stable than any other mortgage products. First of all, more low-income and low median-income families can access the mortgage since it requires a low down payment and monthly payment by fully amortizing in the long run. Secondly, borrowers can refinance their mortgages freely when there is falling interest and prepay the payments without penalties. Most importantly, the fixed rate mortgages transfer the interest rate risk from the borrowers to the lenders, protecting families from unexpected interest rate increases.  The long-term fixed rate mortgage rate has declined over time (see Chart 6). In 1985, both the 15-year fixed rate mortgages and 30-year fixed rate mortgages had a mortgage interest rate more than 10 percent. At that time, 
Chart 6 - Fixed Rate Mortgage Rate Since 1985 
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the two GSEs, especially Fannie Mae had just gone through a hard period of the economic recession. And the homeownership rate went down a lot in the early 1980s. It was one of the two periods that the U.S. homeownership rate greatly declined (see Chart 1). The other one was the time when the recent housing bubble burst. During the past twenty years, the fixed rate mortgage rate has been decreasing all the time with a slight rebound in 2006. It reached the bottom in 2010, with a 4.27 percent interest rate for 15-year fixed rate mortgage and 4.86 percent interest rate for 30-year fixed rate mortgage, making the mortgage more affordable for low-income families. As government-sponsored institutions, GSEs had the liability to fulfill the federal government’s mission in supporting low-moderate families. The GSEs basically reached the goal before 2001 in purchasing low and moderate single-family residential mortgages (see Table 2).  
Table 2 – GSEs Low and Moderate-Income Goal Performance 
Year Low-Moderate Goal 
Low-Moderate Achieved Single-
Family Only 
Low-Moderate Achieved  
(All Purchases) 
1993 0.30 0.28 NA 
1994 0.30 0.35 NA 
1995 0.30 0.36 NA 
1996 0.40 0.36 0.46 
1997 0.42 0.36 0.46 
1998 0.42 0.37 0.44 
1999 0.42 0.39 0.46 
2000 0.42 0.40 0.50 
2001 0.50 0.40 0.52 
2002 0.50 0.40 0.52 
2003 0.50 0.41 0.52 
2004 0.50 0.45 0.53 
2005 0.52 0.43 0.55 
2006 0.53 0.43 0.57 
2007 0.55 0.40 0.56 
Sources: FHFA, 2010 and the GSE Public Use Database 
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Indeed, the GSEs have expended a substantial effort to provide “affordable lending” products in recent years (Wachter, 2005). “Affordable lending” products are those mortgages or programs which require low down payments and have large impacts for underserved groups and areas. For example, Fannie Mae offers a Conventional 97 that allows for a 3 percent downpayment, which is based on the lower of the home's appraised value or purchase price. For borrowers who can meet certain underwriting standards, Fannie Mae also offers a low down payment option available for properties owned by Fannie Mae called the HomePath loan. It allows a borrower to purchase a Fannie Mae-owned property with as little as a 5 percent downpayment. Freddie Mac’s Affordable Seconds also provides a maximum 95 percent Loan-to-value to supplement their down payment, closing and financing costs, prepaid and rehabilitation costs as a secondary financing tool. These GSEs’ products made great contributions to promoting homeownership.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have played an increasingly pivotal role in residential mortgage debt outstanding. In 1990, the combined Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac share of residential mortgage debt outstanding took 25.7 percent of the total residential mortgage debt outstanding (see Table 3). This number climbed up to 46.7 percent in 2010. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held or securitized more than 5 trillion dollars of residential mortgage debt outstanding in 2010 (see Table 4). The success or failure of the two GSEs can almost determine the fate of the mortgage market and housing market. 
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Table 3 – Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding 
 Combined Enterprise Share  Fannie Mae Share Freddie Mac Share 
1990 25.7% 14.0% 11.7% 
1991 28.5% 15.8% 12.6% 
1992 31.9% 18.1% 13.7% 
1993 34.3% 19.7% 14.7% 
1994 35.0% 20.0% 15.0% 
1995 35.8% 20.6% 15.2% 
1996 36.6% 21.1% 15.4% 
1997 36.6% 21.3% 15.2% 
1998 38.9% 22.9% 16.0% 
1999 40.9% 23.8% 17.1% 
2000 41.5% 23.9% 17.6% 
2001 44.7% 25.9% 18.9% 
2002 45.5% 26.7% 18.8% 
2003 46.3% 28.3% 17.9% 
2004 43.2% 26.2% 17.0% 
2005 40.0% 23.3% 16.8% 
2006 38.8% 22.5% 16.4% 
2007 41.4% 23.8% 17.6% 
2008 44.4% 25.9% 18.5% 
2009 46.6% 27.3% 19.2% 
2010 46.7% 27.7% 19.0% 
Sources: FHFA, Market Data, Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1990-2010 
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Table 4 – Total Mortgages Held or Securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  
of Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1990-2010 (Unit: Million Dollars) 
 Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Combined Enterprises Residential Mortgage Debt 
Outstanding 
1990 $404,703 $338,217 $742,920 $2,893,729 
1991 $484,267 $386,209 $870,476 $3,058,425 
1992 $582,563 $441,410 $1,023,973 $3,212,681 
1993 $662,167 $494,727 $1,156,894 $3,368,360 
1994 $708,402 $533,484 $1,241,886 $3,546,131 
1995 $766,741 $566,469 $1,333,210 $3,719,233 
1996 $835,225 $610,820 $1,446,045 $3,954,526 
1997 $895,816 $640,406 $1,536,222 $4,200,416 
1998 $1,051,658 $733,360 $1,785,018 $4,590,489 
1999 $1,203,086 $862,326 $2,065,412 $5,055,445 
2000 $1,316,844 $968,399 $2,285,243 $5,508,592 
2001 $1,579,398 $1,150,723 $2,730,121 $6,102,611 
2002 $1,840,218 $1,297,081 $3,137,299 $6,896,266 
2003 $2,209,388 $1,397,630 $3,607,018 $7,797,171 
2004 $2,325,256 $1,505,531 $3,830,787 $8,872,741 
2005 $2,336,807 $1,684,546 $4,021,353 $10,049,205 
2006 $2,506,482 $1,826,720 $4,333,202 $11,163,068 
2007 $2,846,812 $2,102,676 $4,949,488 $11,954,031 
2008 $3,081,655 $2,207,476 $5,289,131 $11,906,478 
2009 $3,202,041 $2,250,539 $5,452,580 $11,707,666 
2010 $3,156,192 $2,164,859 $5,321,051 $11,387,676 
Sources: FHFA, Market Data, Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1990-2010 
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Section 4 – The Conservation of The GSEs After the overheating of the housing and mortgage market the late 1990s to 2006, the housing and mortgage market took a sudden turn and became worse rapidly. The GSEs, whose major business was mortgage purchase and guarantee, were not able to avoid the fate of collapse. The U.S. government quickly reacted to the GSEs’ loss in order to protect the numerous taxpayers and creditors – who had purchased mortgages issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  In 2008, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) was enacted to provide needed housing reform guidance. HERA established the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) as an independent agency of the Federal government to reinforce the regulation and supervision of the GSEs. The advantage of the FHFA over the former regulator OFHEO consisted in the FHFA absorbed the powers and authority of several entities, including the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), OFHEO, and the HUD GSE mission team, expanding its ability to place the GSEs into receivership or conservation.  At the same time, the Act set up improvements of supervision missions to offset the flaws in the precrisis business model of the GSEs. It established a public use database and opened mortgage data report to improve the transparency of the enterprise operation. It reset the affordable housing goal and duty to serve underserved markets to ensure the GSEs would not be forced to purchase nonprime mortgages to reach their goals.  More importantly, it limited the loan to value of each mortgage and set up maximum limits for conforming loans for different household sizes in different areas, which aimed at providing the borrowers 
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adequate loans within their ability to pay back the debt. Typically, a mortgage secured by a single-family residence shall not exceed $417,000, a mortgage secured by a 2-family residence shall not exceed $533,850, a mortgage secured by a 3-family residence shall not exceed $645,300, and a mortgage secured by a 4-family residence shall not exceed $801,950.  Another important action to GSE conservation is the establishment of Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which rules that whenever an Enterprise’s liabilities exceed its assets, the Treasury provides sufficient cash to ensure the Enterprise maintained solvency. In exchange for Treasury’s funding commitment, the Enterprises were required to provide Treasury senior preferred stock, quarterly dividends, warrants to purchase 79.9% of each Enterprise’s common stock, and commitment fees (Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General, 2013).  Each Enterprise is required to pay to the U.S. Department of the Treasury a quarterly dividend equal to 10 percent of the total amount drawn under their respective agreements. Meanwhile, the terms of the agreements require a 10 percent reduction in the Enterprises' retained portfolios each year to further reduce risk exposure and simplify the operation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Under the PSPAs, the U.S. Treasury received senior preferred stock with a stated value of 2 billion dollars. The cumulative draws from Treasury commitments to finance Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have reached 187.485 billion dollars until the third quarter in 2013(See Table 5). Thus, the Treasury has liquidation preferences ahead of other stockholders to receive 
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189.485 billion dollars if the Enterprises are liquidated (Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General, 2013).  
Table 5 – Quarterly Draws on Treasury Commitments to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
per the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements ($ billions) 
 Fannie Mae Freddie Mac 
Quarter GAAP Net 
Worth 
Requested 
Draw 
Cumulative 
Draws 
GAAP Net 
Worth 
Requested 
Draw 
Cumulative 
Draws 
2008 Q3 9.4 0.0 0.0 -13.7 13.8 13.8 
2008 Q4 -15.2 15.2 15.2 -30.6 30.8 44.6 
2009 Q1 -18.9 19.0 34.2 -6.0 6.1 50.7 
2009 Q2 -10.6 10.7 44.9 8.2 0 50.7 
2009 Q3 -15.0 15.0 59.9 10.4 0 50.7 
2009 Q4 -15.3 15.3 75.2 4.4 0 50.7 
2010 Q1 -8.4 8.4 83.6 -10.5 10.6 61.3 
2010 Q2 -1.4 1.5 85.1 -1.7 1.8 63.1 
2010 Q3 -2.4 2.5 87.6 -0.1 0.1 63.2 
2010 Q4 -2.5 2.6 90.2 -0.4 0.5 63.7 
2011 Q1 -8.4 8.5 98.7 1.2 0 63.7 
2011 Q2 -5.087 5.087 103.787 -1.478 1.479 65.179 
2011 Q3 -7.791 7.791 111.578 -5.991 5.992 71.171 
2011 Q4 -4.571 4.571 116.149 -0.146 0.146 71.317 
2012 Q1 0.268 0 116.149 -0.019 0.019 71.336 
2012 Q2 2.77 0 116.149 1.086 0 71.336 
2012 Q3 2.412 0 116.149 4.906 0 71.336 
2012 Q4 7.224 0 116.149 8.826 0 71.336 
2013 Q1 59.368 0 116.149 6.971 0 71.336 
2013 Q2 13.243 0 116.149 7.357 0 71.336 
2013 Q3 11.616 0 116.149 33.436 0 71.336 
Cumulative Draw by Both Enterprises 187.485 
Sources: FHFA, Market Data, Current Data on Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs  
for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities 
 In the first four years under the PSPAs, from 2008 to 2011 the two GSEs’ quarterly GAAP net worth were mostly negative, and this was especially true for Fannie Mae, which suffered from losses for thirteen continuous quarters (from 2008 Q4 to 2011 Q4). With the financial support from the Treasury, the GSEs’ condition took a favorable turn in 2012. The two GSEs’ 
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net worth turned positive in 2012 and became even better in 2013. The Treasury no longer paid for the GSEs’ net loss when the GSEs did not have a deficit.  In terms of the quarterly dividends paid for the Treasury, the dividends accrued started at 6 million dollars for both Enterprises in the third quarter in 2008. The number gradually became larger and larger as the situation of the two GSEs got better. The financial gap between their quarterly draws and dividends decreased during time (see Chart 7).  In 2012, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s quarterly dividends paid to the Treasury exceeded their draws from the Treasury. As of December 31, 2013, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had paid back the Treasury 185.224 billion dollars in total, which is almost the same amount as the Treasury’s financial support (see Table 6). But Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s operation statues were better off by gaining a positive net worth in the most recent periods. The Treasury could continuously receive benefits after their financial support 
Chart 7 – Quarterly Gap between Enterprises 
Draws and Dividends ($billions) 
 
Sources: FHFA, Market Data, Current Data on Treasury and Federal 
Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities  
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amount is paid back. At this time, the implicit government guarantee has become explicit. And Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac survived through the conservation. 
Table 6 – Dividends on Enterprise Paid for Treasury ($billions) 
 Fannie Mae Freddie Mac 
Quarter Dividends Accrued Cumulative 
Dividends Paid 
Dividends Accrued Cumulative 
Dividends Paid 
2008 Q3 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
2008 Q4 0.025 0.031 0.167 0.173 
2009 Q1 0.025 0.056 0.370 0.543 
2009 Q2 0.409 0.465 1.149 1.692 
2009 Q3 0.885 1.350 1.294 2.986 
2009 Q4 1.150 2.500 1.293 4.279 
2010 Q1 1.527 4.027 1.293 5.572 
2010 Q2 1.909 5.936 1.293 6.865 
2010 Q3 2.117 8.053 1.560 8.425 
2010 Q4 2.153 10.206 1.603 10.028 
2011 Q1 2.216 12.422 1.605 11.633 
2011 Q2 2.281 14.703 1.618 13.251 
2011 Q3 2.495 17.198 1.618 14.869 
2011 Q4 2.621 19.819 1.655 16.524 
2012 Q1 2.819 22.638 1.808 18.332 
2012 Q2 2.931 25.569 1.808 20.140 
2012 Q3 2.929 28.498 1.808 21.948 
2012 Q4 2.929 31.427 1.808 23.756 
2013 Q1 4.224 35.651 5.826 29.582 
2013 Q2 59.368 95.019 6.971 36.553 
2013 Q3 10.243 105.262 4.357 40.910 
2013 Q4 8.616 113.878 30.436 71.346 
Cumulative Dividends Paid by Both Enterprises 185.224 
Sources: FHFA, Market Data, Current Data on Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs  
for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities   
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Section 5 – The Prospects of The GSEs Five years have passed since the federal government’s takeover of the GSEs. The future of the GSEs has been an issue of concern among millions of U.S. taxpayers. Some experts cited Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s inefficient function in the housing market, and concluded that once the housing and financial markets recover from the recent turmoil, shutting down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would have, at most, a minimal impact on the overall housing market (Ligon, 2013). Others pinpointed the indispensable position of the two GSEs, arguing that without an adequate supply of mortgage finance from Fannie and Freddie, the housing market’s decline would likely have been far deeper, with even more dire consequences for the overall economy (England, 2010). Peter J. Wallison, a fellow in Financial Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), explains that many observers do not believe the two GSEs can survive the immense losses they will cause taxpayers, but this is far from true (Wallison, 2010). More importantly, there is not even a hint of a new mortgage financing system that can replace the GSEs’ system. In light of the central role that the GSEs played and still play today, every step on the future role of the GSEs should be cautious.  
Three Possible Approaches for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Most proposals have identified three possible approaches for the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – a hybrid public/private model, a fully federal agency, and a fully private secondary mortgage market without Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.   
 
A Hybrid Public/Private Model 
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Many proposals for the secondary mortgage market put forward a hybrid model that combines private for-profit or nonprofit firms and federal government guarantees on qualifying MBSs. The hybrid public/private model preserves many features of the precrisis model, but it would differ from the precrisis model in several significant aspects. One of the most important differences would be the transformation of the implicit federal government guarantee to an explicit federal government guarantee, and their subsidy cost would be recorded in the federal budget. As mentioned, the weakness of the implicit federal government guarantee lies in offering GSEs many privileges while invading and violating the market rules without compensating the market.  An explicit federal government guarantee would measure the guarantee effects in terms of money and could require the GSEs to pay back a reasonable amount if the guarantee is recorded. During the conservation period, the Treasury has committed to provide funding to GSEs’ operation as an explicit federal government guarantee in order to maintain their solvency. In return, dividends were paid back to the Treasury and a 10 percent reduction in the Enterprises' retained portfolios each year was committed. The explicit guarantee did not make too much burden for the federal government as it was mostly paid back, in other words, it did not put too much risk for taxpayers, while the GSEs’ situation became better.  The advantage of a hybrid model is obvious in several ways. First of all, like the precrisis model, an explicit federal government guarantee would ensure accessibility and liquidity in the secondary market. As many professionals have worried, without a government guarantee, the mortgage market would not be able to provide enough accessibility for low and median income families. In the second place, long term, fixed rate mortgages would not be fully 
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supported in the mortgage market without a government guarantee. Compared with the precrisis model, imposing recorded guarantee fees would ensure that taxpayers received some compensation for the risks they were assuming (Congressional Budget Office Financial Analysis Division, 2010).  However, a hybrid public/private model would still suffer from the contradiction of pursuing affordable housing goals to fulfill a public mission and making maximum profits to serve private shareholders in the precrisis model. Additionally, the government would have trouble setting risk-sensitive prices for guarantees and it would be hard to find an exact balance in distributing some risks to the GSEs or shifting some risks to taxpayers.  
A Fully Federal Agency Another approach of a fully federal agency would not be the same model before 1968 when the GSEs’ financial operation fully depended on federal budget. In contrast, this alternative would rely on private institutions created by the federal government to guarantee and securitize qualifying mortgages. By providing explicit protection against default risk to investors, the cost of the program could be fully or partially covered by charging guarantee fees. The fully federal agency model would enable Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to continue buying mortgages from originators and securitizing them. The main difference is that they would be prohibited from holding mortgage portfolios.  The advantage of a fully federal agency is that it would ensure enough funds flow into the secondary mortgage market during both normal times and times of stress. A fully federal 
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agency model would be more easily controlled compared with the hybrid public/private model since it would not be essential to serve the private shareholders. Furthermore, guarantee fees could be adjusted to control the size of various kinds of mortgage portfolios. The federal agency could give a lower guarantee fees to low-income families and underserved areas as a political preference towards the disadvantaged groups.  A fully federal agency model would limit Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s revenue resources to guarantee fees. The guarantee fees could be quite high if the federal agency wants to be financial independent, which may be unbearable for many originators.  However, if the federal agency model maintains low mortgage guarantee fees as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did before, the federal agency would probably need financial support from the federal government, imposing significant credit risk to taxpayers. Therefore, it violates the fundamental principal of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) that protects the benefits of the taxpayers. For these reasons, a fully federal agency model may not be the best choice for the future of the GSEs at this moment. 
 
A Fully Private Secondary Mortgage Market Some observers have proposed completely privatizing the secondary mortgage market and shutting down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Under that approach, there would be no federal government guarantees of MBSs or debt securities. The federal government could wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sell their assets in pieces or sell the enterprises as a whole to private investors. It would stop the half-century monopoly of the GSEs in the 
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secondary mortgage market and provide the private sector a fully competitive mortgage market.   To realize a fully private secondary mortgage market, requires a significant departure from the status quo of the GSEs because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac played an even more dominant role in the mortgage market since conservation. The federal government could start with stopping the explicit guarantee and eliminating the dominant effect of government guaranteed mortgages. If Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac no longer had the advantage of federal backing, other large financial institutions could compete with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in a securitization market. When the mortgage market reaches a more balanced situation those financial institutions other than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac take a steadily large portion of the mortgages, the federal government could break up or liquidate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to accelerate the privatization process. More private sector firms would be able to join the secondary mortgage market if the two giants were broken up. Finally, the secondary mortgage market would be dominated by the private sector and form a fully private mortgage market without Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.   The privatization of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would increase competition in the secondary mortgage market. On one hand, competition may cause the private sector to take too much risk as they did in the subprime mortgage crisis. On the other hand, competition would reduce the market’s reliance on one or two firms, leading to a reduction of systemic risk caused by the GSEs. A private secondary market would ensure that the private sector takes the credit risks, shifting the risk from the federal government in the hybrid 
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public/private model and the fully federal agency model. A private secondary mortgage market would reflect a more accurate mortgage rate relating to the housing market, credit records and down payments. A private mortgage market without government guarantees does not mean that it is a market without government intervention. On the contrary, more specific regulations should be made to require private sectors to check and understand the borrowers’ ability to repay the debt, to ask private sectors to take full responsibility to consider the best kind of mortgages for borrowers to reduce the risks for both sides.  In fact, the Dodd-Frank has regulated qualified residential mortgages (QRMs) as a loan that aims to minimize the borrower’s risk and control default rate. For non-QRM loans sold into the private secondary market, mortgage lenders must retain a portion of the loan’s risk.  The disadvantage of a private secondary market can be seen in several aspects. One potential problem of the fully private mortgage market is that the private sector, which pursues the maximum profits, does not care about and would probably not provide special assistance to low and median income borrowers and underserved areas. It is hard for federal or local governments to ask the private sectors to give special privileges to low-income groups. Affordable housing goals would be more difficult to implement without federal government support. The federal government may need to find other intermediaries to support affordable housing programs that are currently channeled through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Unlike a fully federal agency, a private secondary mortgage market is less adjustable and controllable if the housing market goes down. A fully risk management mechanism should be prepared for the private secondary market.  
 34 
The future of the GSEs will have a dominant role in determining the secondary mortgage market. Three possible approaches for the future of the GSEs have their merits and drawbacks (see Table 7). Even though, a fully federal agency may not be a best way compared with a hybrid public/private model and a fully private secondary market model at this moment, there is no sound evidence that demonstrates any certain model would ensure an accessible, stable, and sustainable secondary mortgage market for all taxpayers. Now is the time to think about a detour to regain the dream – promoting homeownership and providing affordable housing to Americans. Stepping out of the secondary mortgage market may provide a broader view of the future of U.S. housing finance system.
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Table 7 – Decision Matrix of Different Influence on Various Parties Based on the GSEs’ Possible Approaches  A Hybrid Public/Private Model A Fully Federal Agency A Fully Private Secondary Mortgage Market 
Affected Parties Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Federal 
Government 
Explicit guarantees can be recorded in the federal budget so that federal government can gain revenues from the guarantees; as a hybrid public/private enterprise, the federal government can be easier to carry out public missions. 
It may be hard to calculate the explicit guarantees and set the risk-sensitive prices for guarantee fees. 
Federal government can fully control the agency and carry out public mission without serving the private shareholders. 
A fully federal agency may narrow its business to guarantee business, which may yield a high guarantee fees; the federal government may need to support their business if they want to keep the guarantee fees affordable. 
Federal government does not involve any financial support; they can still regulate the market by regulations and laws. 
Affordable housing goals and underserved areas are hard to be addressed in a fully private secondary mortgage market; federal government may loss support from the weak groups. 
Taxpayers (See Borrowers) 
Taxpayers may still be exposed to credit risk because of federal government’s guarantee on GSEs’ business. (See Borrowers) 
Taxpayers are exposed to credit risk if the federal government decides to support the guarantee business. 
With no financial support from the government means the federal government does not use the taxpayers’ money to support the market. 
(See Borrowers) 
Private 
Financial 
Institutions 
Private financial institutions may be better off for the GSEs would pay for the explicit privilege they have. 
Private financial institutions are still in a week position because federal government does not back up their MBS business. 
Private financial institutions can expand their mortgage business by purchasing and holding more MBS. 
To attract investors, they may need to pay higher guarantees fees to get federal government guarantees compared to the hybrid model. 
Private financial institutions can compete equally in a fully competitive market. 
Competitive sometimes may lead to serious consequences like the wide spreading of the Subprime and Alt-A mortgages. 
Borrowers 
Government involving in the mortgage market can ensure the liquidity, accessibility and affordability of the mortgage at all times. (See Taxpayers) 
Government involving in the mortgage market can ensure the liquidity, accessibility and affordability of the mortgage at all times. (See Taxpayers) (See Taxpayers) 
Borrowers with low and median income, as well as poor credit records may not be able to get loans; the mortgage rates are easily manipulated in a private mortgage market. 
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Section 6 – Conclusion The GSEs’ role has changed over time. Whatever and whenever their role was, they played a pivotal role in the secondary mortgage market and exercised a tremendous influence on the U.S. housing market. It is ironic that the GSEs was a vital factor of the success of the U.S. housing finance system for a long time since their establishment, in the meanwhile they took great responsibility for the subprime mortgage crisis and housing bubble in recent years. The prospects of the GSEs greatly affect the housing market, mortgage market and macroeconomic in the United States. Every step towards the future of the GSEs should be paid with great attention and caution.  The three possible approaches indicate the alternatives of the GSEs’ future. However, based on present analysis, none of them gives a perfect solution that can make sure a bright future of the housing and mortgage market with or without GSEs’ existence. No matter what approach the federal government chooses, it will not make sure the market would follow exactly the same pattern as the federal government’s expectation. However, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’ transformation from the entire federal agency model to the public/private agency model so far has not been sustainably successful. Furthermore, one of the fundamental points in the future is that the GSEs should not cause further potential losses to taxpayers after they have repaid the creditors. A fully private secondary mortgage market may be a more reliable way to avoid the reoccurrence of the flaws in the precrisis model, which is consistent with decision from the 2013 Corker-Warner Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act.  
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The Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act decided to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac within five years. Instead, the federal government will create the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC) to take part of the GSEs’ functions. In order to eliminate the drawbacks of a private secondary mortgage market, the Act specifies the FMIC would only guarantee losses in excess of 10 percent, a threshold intended to require private investors to fully bear losses well beyond those observed during the 2008 financial crisis. The federal government guarantee would only be effective when the market suffers from a catastrophic scenario to make sure the liquidity and stability of the mortgage market. The more recent Johnson-Crapo bill repeals mandatory affordable housing goals the Congress enacted in the early 1990s, but charges borrowers a 10 basis point premium dedicated to three affordable housing funds to support affordable housing and make up the weakness of underserving low-income families in a private market. Future reforms on GSEs and the mortgage market should emphasize more on the numbers and percentages involved in these reforms. For example, what percentage of downpayment for the QRM can maximize the utility of the mortgage that reduces the risk while ensures the most accessibility at the same time. Additionally, the federal government should ask questions like would a 10 percent guarantee for the losses be the best for private investors to take the most responsibility while it can ensure the ongoing of the secondary mortgage market at all times. Therefore, whatever the decision has been made on the GSEs and the mortgage market at the moment, the federal government should keep focusing on the reaction of the market to any GSEs’ future approach, and make appropriately corresponding actions to maintain the healthy development of the market and prevent market failure. 
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